The macroeconomic effects of changes in the level of UI benefits: the role of reform features and context
The project will involve the study of the impact of UI reforms in Austria on wages and other labor market outcomes. It may also include the analysis of UI reforms in other countries.
(1) Combine a standard Nash wage bargaining model with a more grounded assumption about the condition for renegotiation (namely renegotiation by mutual agreement) as well as the contextual features of the UI reforms in Austria, namely that UI benefits are indexed to previous individual earnings and that UI reforms apply to new unemployment spells only.
(2) Identify the predicted mechanisms and consequences resulting from the additional features. (To give an example, with many simplifying assumptions, standard wage determination models predict a positive impact of changes in UI benefits on wages. However, if the UI reforms apply to new unemployment spells only, then the standard models predict a negative impact of changes in UI benefits on the wages of those individuals who are unemployed when the reform takes place. Furthermore, the standard Nash wage bargaining model predicts no impact of changes in UI benefits on the wages of those workers who stay with their current employer after the reform and who do not experience a renegotiation.)
(3) Identify the equilibrium effects of these additional features.
(4) Empirically verify the plausibility and quantitative importance of the mechanisms resulting from the additional features.
Membres du projet :
- Daniel Gyetvai, Sciences Po
État du projet : en cours
Ce projet est financé par la chaire Sécurisation des Parcours Professionnels.